U.S. Agriculture: A Weak Link

In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Centers, enormous amounts of government and private sector resources have been directed towards biological terrorism detection and prevention. Unfortunately, a surprisingly small portion of these resources have been allocated to the United States agricultural industry and the impact a biological attack could have on this multi-billion dollar industry. Maybe this is because as U.S. citizens we take for granted the bountiful supply of food we see at the supermarkets or because history has trained us to believe that terrorists are consumed with traditional methods like car bombs and suicide bombers. Whatever the reason, the events of 9-11 and subsequent anthrax attacks should serve as a wake up call. Terrorists are changing the way they do business. With this in mind, let us look at the U.S. agricultural industry with an emphasis on the threat posed by a carefully planned biological attack.

First things first. What is meant by the word threat? One definition comes Dr. Lani Kass at the National War College. Written out, it states: Vulnerabilities X Capabilities X Intentions = Threat

This definition shows that only when you have an identifiable vulnerability to an event, and an enemy has the specific intentions and capabilities to carry out that event, does a viable threat exist. All three pieces of the formula must be present. The paragraphs that follow outline the vulnerabilities the agricultural industry exhibits to a biological attack, the capabilities of terrorists in handling specific biological agents, and what I believe would be the main reasons or intentions behind an attack on the agricultural industry.

Vulnerabilities

One of the main reasons the United States agricultural industry is vulnerable to a biological attack is because of the vast commercialization and economization of agricultural production. Technological advances now allow crops and animals to be raised with much greater efficiencies and in much denser concentrations than just a few years ago. Take the United States cattle industry for example. Eighty-four percent of the U.S. cattle population is concentrated in the southwest. Even more interesting, 78 percent of these cattle pass through a mere two percent of the available feedlots. These feedlots regularly contain more than 150,000 head of cattle, with some holding in excess of 300,000.

In California, 92 percent of the U.S. grape production is grown and harvested, as well as 78 percent of the lettuce production. Furthermore, 60 percent of the swine population is located in the Midwest, and 78 percent of the chicken population in the southeast Atlantic. Overall, 34 percent of all agricultural production in the United States comes from five states (California, Texas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Illinois).

This dangerous localization is only the beginning. The majority of crops and livestock in the United States are not only unprotected, but also openly exposed to the environment and within a stones throw of public access roads and highways. Recently, the livestock industry has begun practicing increasingly intense animal rearing, breeding, and transportation practices, as well as increased use of steroids, hormone treatments, and artificial insemination. These practices have led to extremely high stress levels in today’s animals, drastically reducing their natural immune systems, and making them much more susceptible to disease.

Capabilities

Compared with the use of nuclear, chemical, radiological, or even biological weapons against humans, "weaponizing" biological agents to infect crops or livestock is relatively easy. Unlike many human targeted chemical and biological weapons that require sophisticated dissemination tactics and ideal weather conditions, the use of biological weapons against agricultural assets is extremely “low tech.” Several plant and animal pathogens need only to come in contact with the surface of the target to cause infection. Foot and mouth disease (FMD), for example, is highly contagious and does not need to be cultured. A small amount strategically dispersed in a feedlot could cause catastrophic damages. Moreover, some of these same pathogens cannot be spread to humans, making them safe for terrorists to handle.

Infecting crops is potentially just as easy. Fly-overs with chemical bearing crop dusters could infect hundreds of square miles of producing land making it useless for years to come. Unlike flying over cities, pass-overs in largely agricultural areas could potentially be dismissed as seasonal crop dusting operations. An even more inconspicuous method would be to destroy crops from the bottom-up by poisoning the soil with root and lower stem diseases or walking, running, etc., through fields with fungal contaminated clothing.

Obtaining agents that could destroy particular livestock and/or crops may prove the most difficult aspect. Unfortunately, this is not all that hard either. Terrorists could obtain pathogens from infected animals or diseased crops, buy them from international laboratories and repositories, or even purchase them on the black market.

Intentions

No foreign state is going to stand toe-to-toe with the United States. To do so would mean certain destruction at the hands of the most superior military power in the world. To cripple the United States of America, you have to go for the jugular: money! This is where I see agricultural terrorism taking its largest toll.

The agriculture industry represents approximately 13 percent of the gross domestic product and provides jobs for approximately 17 percent of domestic workers. Agricultural exports account for nearly eight percent of all U.S. exports with a total value of over $50 billion. Overall, the industry’s impact of the U.S. economy is in the neighborhood of $1-2 trillion.

A well-orchestrated attack would have significant economic ramifications for years after the attack. Take the FMD outbreak in Taiwan in 1997. As a result of this outbreak, Taiwan lost its principle export markets for pork, namely Japan. Within one week of the outbreak, swine prices had dropped by 60 percent and approximately 50,000 people lost their jobs. It is estimated that the total cost of the incident is in excess of $7 billion.

The ripple effect from such an attack would be enormous. The drop in prices alone would cause the failure of thousands of farms. This would in turn affect nearly every aspect of the local communities in which these farms were based. Containment and decontamination costs would be astronomical, not to mention, compensation costs to farmers affected by the slaughter of their herds. Every industry tied to agriculture would be affected. Truckers, grocers, equipment dealers, etc. would all be affected. Less obvious industries like tourism would also be affected. Some reports state that the United Kingdom has lost out on some $5 billion in tourism revenue as a result of the FMD outbreak in 2001.

As shown above, a biological attack against the United States agricultural industry is more than a possibility, it is a viable threat. This industry is vulnerable, and terrorists could gain the biological capabilities with minimal effort. Furthermore, economic destabilization could be the perfect weapon against the last remaining super power in the world; however, steps can be taken by city, state, and federal agencies, as well as the general public to alleviate this threat. That will be the subject of a future FOCUS newsletter.

Justin Mullinax